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The growth effects of international financial liberalization and integration are investigated us-
ing the methodology and data developed by Rajan and Zingales (1998). The main result is 
that industries highly dependent on external financing do not experience higher growth in 
value added in countries with liberalized financial markets. Liberalization does, however, in-
crease the growth rates of both production and firm creation among externally dependent in-
dustries – given that the countries have reached a relatively high level of financial develop-
ment. These results are consistent both with increased competition and increased outsourcing. 
Some preliminary evidence point towards the latter explanation. 
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1. Introduction 
An important subject in international economics concerns the growth effects of international 
financial liberalization and integration. Despite substantial research efforts, it is fair to say that 
a consensus remains to be reached (see, e.g., the surveys by Eichengreen, 2001, Arteta et al., 
2001, and Edison et al., 2002a). Whereas previous work has mainly approached the problem 
by considering growth rates of country aggregates, this paper analyzes growth effects at the 
industry level, using the well-known and widely used methodology and data from Rajan and 
Zingales (1998). We extend their analysis on financial development and growth by testing if 
industries highly dependent on external financing experience a faster growth in countries with 
liberalized capital accounts, liberalized equity markets, and that are well-integrated with 
global capital markets. Specifically, we look for growth effects in value added, production, 
and the number of establishments. The main result is that growth in value added is unrelated 
to all the investigated dimensions of liberalization. Both growth in the number of establish-
ments and production is, however, higher when capital markets are liberalized, but only if the 
countries have reached a relatively high level of financial development. 
 
These results are consistent with two explanations, a competition effect and an outsourcing 
effect. If financial liberalization reduces the financing constraints faced by new firms, firm 
creation is stimulated. When new firms enter a market, this generally means that competition 
and production increase while markups, and eventually profits, decrease. Hence, while there 
may be more firms and higher production on a market, the margins for each firm shrink and 
industry value-added may therefore be unaffected or even decrease. Outsourcing, on the other 
hand, would mean breaking up value added chains. A pattern of constant value added, a larger 
number of firms, and a higher level of (measured) production is therefore consistent with out-
sourcing. Some preliminary and indirect evidence point towards the latter explanation. To our 
knowledge, these links between financial liberalization, outsourcing and competition have not 
previously been analyzed and hence our paper is a first attempt at drawing attention to these 
issues.  
  
The literature on the real effects of financial liberalization and integration is both large and 
growing. Most previous studies have focused on the aggregate growth effects. In a widely 
cited study, Rodrik (1998) finds no effect of liberalized capital accounts, either on the per cap-
ita GDP growth rate or the investment to GDP ratio. Using a somewhat different indicator of 
capital account liberalization, as well as different econometric techniques, both Quinn (1997)   3
and Edwards (2001) find positive growth effects. Edwards qualifies his finding by noting that 
a certain level of economic development must be reached before an open capital account has 
positive growth effects. This controversy between Rodrik and Edwards is discussed by Arteta 
et al. (2001), who argue that it is largely due to the use of different indicators of capital ac-
count liberalization. While Rodrik uses the IMF binary indicator, Edwards uses a multi-level 
index of Quinn (1997) which, according to Arteta et al., also seems to be the more compre-
hensive of the two. In a recent study, Edison et al. (2002b) use a wide variety of indicators of 
international financial liberalization and integration, similar to those used in our study, and 
fail to find any effects on aggregate economic growth. 
 
Another branch of the literature focuses on the growth effects of liberalizing equity markets. 
Henry (2000a,b) applies an event study approach to his careful classification of economic re-
forms in 11 developing countries and finds a temporary increase in stock prices and invest-
ments following stock market liberalization. Bekaert and Harvey (2000) use a similar ap-
proach and find the cost of capital to be somewhat reduced after a stock market liberalization. 
Using firm level evidence, Chari and Henry (2001) document an increase in firms’ capital 
stocks post liberalization, but cannot confirm this to be due to a lower cost of capital. Using a 
different methodology to classify liberalization events, Bekaert et al. (2000, 2001) find a tem-
porary increase in per capita growth rates following equity market liberalization. In a paper 
combining firm level and macroeconomic data, Harrison et al. (2001) document that foreign 
direct investments reduce, and capital account restrictions increase firms’ financing con-
straints. Although this last paper is close to ours in spirit, it uses a completely different meth-
odology. While we assume the industry dependence on external funds to be equal across 
countries, Harrison et al. calculate a proxy for firm level financial constraints using Euler 
equations. Although their proxy gives a more precise estimate of a firm’s financial position 
than our indicator of external dependence, it is also subject to more severe endogeneity prob-
lems. Hence, the two approaches should be seen as complements rather than substitutes. 
 
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the basic methodology used in the paper 
and Section 3 describes the data. In Section 4, the results regarding capital account liberaliza-
tion are presented and Section 5 shows the results on actual financial integration. Section 6 
concludes.   4
 
2. The Basic Methodology 
 
If the liberalization of international capital movements relaxes the financial constraints faced 
by industrial corporations, industries highly dependent on external financing should grow 
faster in countries with deregulated capital markets than in those where the opposite applies. 
Similarly, industries dependent on external financing should grow faster in countries more 
integrated with international capital markets. In an influential paper, Rajan and Zingales 
(1998) ask a related question when investigating if industries highly dependent on external 
financing grow faster in countries with well-developed domestic financial markets. In order to 
make the results in the present paper as comparable to this study as possible, we use both the 
methodology and the basic data employed by Rajan and Zingales. To investigate the growth 
effects, we study the growth rates of real value added, real production, and the number of es-
tablishments. The motivation behind the last variable is that new firms are often established 
using funds raised externally from the banking sector or the stock market. These capital sup-
pliers are, in turn, dependent on a sufficiently large capital market from which they can attract 
their own funding. When the size of a country’s capital market is restricted, for example by 
restrictions on cross-border capital flows, the number of new projects that are financed will 
also be limited. If the mechanism that liberalized capital accounts eventually increases the 
pool of capital available to entrepreneurs is correct, then one should, according to our ap-
proach, be able to trace this effect on the industries that are relatively dependent on external 
financing. 
 
Empirically, this means that we will estimate the following relationship 
 
(2.1)  Growthij = β1 (External dependencei × Liberalizationj (or) Integrationj) +  
β2 (External dependencei × Financial developmentj) +  
β3 Industry share in 1980ij + Σ β4,i Di + Σ β5,j Dj + εij. 
 
i is the industry and j the country subscript. Growthij is the average annual growth rate over 
the period 1980–1990 of real value added, the number of establishments or real output. In the 
analysis below, we examine these three measures separately. Industry share in 1980ij is indus-
try i’s share of total value added in manufacturing in country j in 1980, Di is a set of industry 
dummies, and Dj a set of country dummies. We include interaction variables between indica-  5
tors of financial liberalization or integration and the proxies of external dependence created 
by Rajan and Zingales, which constitute the prime variable of interest. The liberalization and 
integration indicators belong to three classes: rule-based indicators on capital account liberali-
zation; rule-based indicators of equity market liberalization; and actual capital market integra-
tion as measured by flows and stocks of foreign direct and portfolio investments. The time 
period of the study, 1980-90, is determined by the measure of external dependence being cal-
culated using 1980’s data. Although we would have liked to include data from the 1990s in 
our analysis, we are aware of the fact external dependence measure, on which the entire ap-
proach crucially hinges, seems quite variable over time and hence needs to be updated as of-
ten as possible without creating serious inconsistencies in the results.
1  
 
The specification (2.1) means that we are looking for a growth effect of financial liberaliza-
tion and integration on top of the growth effect of financial development. This is important to 
keep in mind since a possible channel through which international financial integration can 
affect growth is by enhancing the performance of the domestic financial sector (see, e.g., Le-
vine and Zervos, 1998, Klein and Olivei, 1999, and Levine, 2001). Throughout the analysis 
we also split the country sample according to the level of financial development, having one 
group of countries above and one group below the median level of financial development. The 
background is the recent findings (e.g., Laeven, 2000; Edwards, 2001) that the impact of fi-
nancial liberalization on growth may depend on the level of financial development in a coun-
try.
2 Basically, this is mainly due to the fact that developed economies are better able to make 
productive use of new capital inflows than are emerging market economies. There is, how-
ever, no broad consensus along these lines and few studies have actually examined this im-
pact. 
 
As is common in the growth regression framework, there may be potential concerns about the 
endogeneity of the regressors. It is possible that countries where externally dependent indus-
tries were expected to grow rapidly during the 1980s were more prone to liberalize capital 
movements at the beginning of the decade. Therefore, besides the ordinary least squares, we 
                                                             
1 Rajan and Zingales (1998) compute external dependency measures for 1970 and 1980 and report a correlation 
between these of approximately 0.75. 
2 Edwards (2001) actually uses income rather than financial development when dividing the sample of countries 
into high- and low levels. We argue, however, that financial development is a more relevant dimension, since 
what really counts is the ability to allocate the capital to producers in the economy and not whether the country 
in general is rich.   6
will also run two-stage regressions in order to instrument for the liberalization indicators. The 




Except for data on capital account liberalization, equity market liberalization, international 
financial integration and industry level output, all other data is thoroughly described by Rajan 
and Zingales (1998). For this reason, the discussion of these variables and their sources will 
be kept brief here. The period under consideration is the 1980’s, and the data covers a maxi-
mum of 42 countries (for the country coverage among different sub-samples, see Table A1). 
 
3.1. Financial dependence 
Rajan and Zingales’ indicator of industry dependence on external financing is based on the 
assumptions that there are underlying technological reasons why industries differ in their use 
of external funds, and that these persist across countries. Furthermore, they note that when 
financial markets work relatively frictionless, the supply of external financing will be very 
elastic. Differences in the actual use of external financing in such an economy will hence 
mainly reflect differences in demand for this type of funding. Arguing that the U.S. financial 
markets are the most advanced in the world, Rajan and Zingales use data on the actual exter-
nal financing pattern of U.S. firms to calculate their measure of external dependence. More 
precisely, their measure is defined as capital expenditures minus the cash flow from opera-
tions, divided by capital expenditures. To smooth fluctuations, they use data on the firm’s ex-
ternal financing and capital expenditure over a 10-year period. The median value of this cal-
culation is then used to indicate the external dependency for each respective industry.
3  
 
3.2. Financial development 
Following much of the literature on the impact of the financial sector on growth, we use two 
different proxies for financial development. Our first indicator is the total capitalization 
measured as the sum of domestic credits and stock market capitalization over GDP. Data on 
domestic credit is from the IMF International Financial Statistics (IFS), and stock market 
capitalization from IFC’s Emerging Stock Markets Factbook. In addition, we use the account-
                                                             
3 According to this indicator, drugs and medicines (ISIC 3522) constitute the most externally dependent industry, 
while the tobacco industry (ISIC 314) is the least so.   7
ing standards of a country.
4 This index is constructed by the Center for International Financial 
Analysis and Research, and rates the annual reports of firms across countries. Focusing on 
information disclosure, this index proxies for the potential to obtain financing, rather than the 
actual outcome.  
 
3.3. Liberalization data  
As we incorporate indicators of capital account liberalization, equity market liberalization, 
and actual flows and stocks of international capital flows, we employ data from a variety of 
sources described below, which all use somewhat different methodologies when calculating 
their indicators. Here, all rule-based indicators are normalized between zero and one, where 
zero implies full restriction and one full liberalization according to the respective index. In 
Table 1, summary statistics and the correlates between the different indices are shown. As can 




3.3.1. Capital account liberalization 
The most commonly used indicator of capital account liberalization is based on data from the 
IMF Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions. In its simplest form, this indicator 
is a dummy variable taking the value 1 if there are any restrictions on capital account transac-
tions, and 0 otherwise. Although this is a very crude measure, it will be used for the year 1980 
(IMF80) as a starting point for our analysis. If the interaction term between external depend-
ence and IMF80 is positive, this shows that industries highly dependent on external financing 
experienced a faster subsequent growth in countries where the capital account was open in 
1980. As an alternative, this indicator is averaged over the 1980’s (IMF8090), which means 
that it measures the proportion of years during the 1980’s when the capital account has been 
classified as open by the IMF.
5 While the IMF-indicators tell us whether a restriction is in 
place, they have little to say about how severe these restrictions actually are. In an attempt to 
correct for this shortcoming, Quinn (1997) has constructed an index for several years and a 
wide cross-section of countries, based on how strict the imposed regulations actually are.
6 
Here, the Quinn-index from 1982 (QCAP82) and the average between the 1982 and 1988 val-
                                                             
4 The results using accounting standards are available in the appendix. 
5 Similar indicators have been used by, for example Alesina et al. (1994) in a study of the determinants of capital 
controls, and Rodrik (1998) in a study on how capital controls affect growth, inflation and investments.   8
ues (QCAP8288) are used. The Quinn-indices overlap with the rest of the data for 39 coun-
tries.  
 
Which of these indices to use is not evident as Rodrik (1998), using the IMF index, and Ed-
wards (2001), using the Quinn indices, actually reach different conclusions. Arteta et al. 
(2001) try to evaluate this controversy by testing the quality and consistency of the two indi-
ces. They find that the Quinn indices seem more useful and coherent than those of the IMF, 
although the latter contain a larger sample of countries. All the same, we use both indicators 
because the underlying issue remains unsolved. As will be seen, our results are basically con-
sistent across these indices. 
 
3.3.2. Equity market liberalization 
In order to measure equity market liberalization, we first follow the classification in Bekaert 
et al. (2001). This indicator takes the value of one if equity markets are officially liberalized 
for foreign investors at a certain date, and zero otherwise. BHL80 thus indicates the policies 
in place in 1980, while BHL8090 is the proportion of years between 1980 and 1990 that eq-
uity markets were officially liberalized. These indicators are available for our full set of coun-
tries. Our second indicator is from Kaminsky and Schmukler (2001), who have constructed a 
database that attempts to take into account both different aspects of the liberalization process 
and the severity of the restrictions in place. Here, we use their index of stock market liberali-
zation (KSSTOCK80 and KSSTOCK8090) which relates to the acquisition of shares in the 
domestic market by foreigners, the repatriation of capital, and the repatriation of interest and 
dividends. Unfortunately, these indices only overlap with the rest of the data for 22 countries.  
 
3.3.3. Integration data 
Measuring capital market integration is a well-known difficulty and several candidate meas-
ures are proposed in the literature, all carrying specific pros and cons. In this study, we con-
sider capital flows and stocks relative to the GDP of each country. The focus is mainly on the 
effects of capital flows but Lane and Milesi-Feretti (2001) argue that stocks of capital consti-
tute a measure alleviating some of the problems often associated with flow data, such as sharp 
fluctuations across short periods. Recognizing this point, we include both estimates of capital 
stocks (with the variable name CAPSTOCK) and flows (CAPFLOW) to achieve as complete 
                                                                                                                                                                                          
6 Using the Quinn index of capital account restrictions, Edwards (2001) finds that an open capital account spurs 
aggregate economics growth.    9
a picture as possible. Specifically, we use stocks and flows of inward and outward direct in-
vestments and portfolio assets and liabilities as a share of GDP, calculated as annual averages 
over the period 1980-90 and using data from Lane and Milesi-Feretti (2001). As always when 
using data on cross-country investments, the measures should be treated with great caution 




As reported above, we will run instrumental variables (IV) estimations parallel to the ordinary 
least squares regressions in order to check for the potential reversed causality. As instruments 
for IMF80, we use lagged index values of the IMF indicator from the year 1970 and the 
Quinn (1997) indicator of capital account liberalization (QCAP) from the years 1958 and 
1973. Similarly, QCAP82 is instrumented with its lagged values from 1958 and 1973, BHL80 
and KSSTOCK80 are both instrumented with the Quinn capital account indexes from 1958 
and 1973 as well as the Quinn (1997) indicator of both capital and current account regulation 
from the years 1958 and 1973. CAPSTOCK and CAPFLOW are instrumented with the coun-
try area (in square kilometers), population size in §1980, total trade in 1975 and government 
spending in 1975, respectively, as shares of GDP. These data are from the World Bank’s 
World Development Indicators (World Bank). 
 
3.5. Industry data 
The industry data is from the UN’s Industrial Statistics Yearbook and covers manufacturing 
firms at the three- or four-digit ISIC-level. From Rajan and Zingales’s data set, we get data on 
growth in value added and the number of establishments, or firm creation.
8 As a complement-
tary measure of economic growth, we introduce growth in real output published in the Indus-
trial Statistics Yearbook (and the more recent International Yearbook of Industrial Statistics) 
as output in nominal producer prices. To deflate the output, we follow the procedures of Rajan 
and Zingales (1998) to make the data comparable. This means that the Producer Price Index 
(PPI) is the prime deflator and for countries where no such index is available, an effective de-
flator is computed by dividing the growth in nominal output for the entire manufacturing in-
dustry (ISIC 300) by the index of industrial production, taken from the IFS statistics. For Ja-
maica and Turkey neither an index of production nor a PPI are available and we have thus 
                                                             
7 For example, it could be of importance whether the investments are counted at market or book value, at which 
time of the year this is done, and in which of the two countries the valuation is done.   10
used the Consumer Price Index to deflate the nominal output growth. In the case of Brazil, 
none of these procedures could produce a satisfactory deflator, mainly due to the extreme in-




The results are presented using total capitalization as the measure of financial development. 
In the Appendix, however, we present all the parallel regressions where accounting standards 
have instead been used. On the whole, the results are stronger when we use total capitaliza-
tion, although the other measure does not contradict the presented findings. We do not report 
the results for the indicators representing multi-year averages (IMF8090, QCAP8288, 
BHL8090 and KSSTOCK8090), since they produce practically identical result as the respec-
tive initial year indices. Throughout, OLS-estimates and IV-estimates are reported, together 
with a set of diagnostic tests. A Hausman test of exogeneity tests whether the IV and OLS es-
timates differ significantly and hence if instrumenting would be necessary in the first place.
9 
An F-test shows whether the instruments explain a great deal of the variation in the instru-
mented variable, which is desirable. Finally, a Sargan-test of overidentifying restrictions 
shows whether the instruments have an impact of their own on the dependent variable, which 
is not desirable.  
 
4.1. Effects on growth in value added 
 
Here, we analyze how the liberalization of international capital movements and the integration 
of capital markets affect industry growth in value added, i.e. the industry-level equivalent to 




Table 2 reports the first set of our results. Liberalizing capital accounts does not seem to have 
any direct effects on industry growth in value added. None of the indicators, interacted with 
the external dependency measure, produce significant results in either the OLS or the IV re-
                                                                                                                                                                                          
8 Establishments can principally be treated as firms, although in some cases the collected data underlying the 
ISY variable was not sufficiently legally strictly defined to eliminate the possibility that establishments are not 
”plants within one firm”. 
9 To be precise, our version of the Hausman test was actually proposed by Davidson-MacKinnon (1993).    11
gressions. This is also true for the indicators of equity market liberalization and capital market 
integration.
10 Another finding is that the strong connection between the level of financial de-
velopment and growth in value-added, originally suggested by Rajan and Zingales (1998), is 
robust to controlling for financial liberalization and integration, as shown by the positive and 
significant coefficients of the interaction between external dependency and financial devel-
opment.  
 
In table 3, we test the hypothesis that the level of financial development is of importance for 
the effect of liberalization and integration on growth. This is done by splitting the sample of 
countries with respect to the median value of the two measures of financial development. 
Once more, there seem to be practically no growth effects of financial liberalization or capital 
market integration except in one single case (KSSTOCK80).
11 The results hence contradict 
the evidence of Laeven (2000), suggesting a positive correlation between financial liberaliza-
tion and growth, given a relatively high level of financial development.  
 
[Table 3 here] 
 
4.2. Effects on firm creation 
 
Table 4 reports the results of our tests for a link between financial liberalization as well as fi-
nancial integration and growth in the number of firms, or firm creation, within industries 
highly dependent on external financing. Neither liberalization nor integration categories pro-
duce significant coefficient estimates consistent across both the OLS and IV specifications. 
For IMF80 and the two integrations measures, CAPSTOCK and CAPFLOW, the OLS esti-
mates are positive and significant, but the IV estimates are not. According to the diagnostic 




In table 5, we have split the sample into two groups of countries, either above or below the 
median level of financial development. The picture is now somewhat different. In countries 
with a “high” level of financial development there are strong effects on firm creation within 
                                                             
10 The possible exception is the IV result of BHL80, which is weakly significant at the 10-percent level.   12
industries dependent on external financing. This result holds for most liberalization indicators 
across both the OLS and the IV specifications. The integration variables only produce positive 
significant coefficients in the OLS regressions, but since the diagnostic tests (especially Haus-
man) do not suggest any statistical endogeneity, these results can be accepted all the same. 
Some potential concerns could be raised when the Sargan tests of overidentifying restrictions 
are checked, but since the Hausman tests do not indicate that IV regressions are necessary, the 
positive and significant OLS estimators should suffice for the results to be consistent.  
 
The results seem to stand out clearer when total capitalization rather than accounting stan-
dards is used as a proxy for financial development. One interpretation of this diversity is that 
the different dimensions of financial development really do measure different aspects of the 
financial system. Whereas accounting standards primarily reflect the quality of information 
disclosure and investor protection, total capitalization directly corresponds to the size of mar-
kets for equity and bank borrowing. To make new foreign capital inflows help new projects 
and startups overcome some financing constraints, a well-established system of corporate fi-
nancing might hence be required.  
 
In a more general sense, these findings suggest that more accessible foreign funding helps 
cash-constrained entrepreneurs active in industries relatively dependent on external financing 
to establish new firms. Naturally, we cannot tell whether they use the foreign funding directly 
or that the domestic creditors become keener on investing in new firms, but the final effect is 
the same. In essence, this result confirms the findings of Laeven (2000) that small firms bene-
fited more from financial liberalization than did large firms since, the latter had access to 




4.3. Effects on growth in output 
 
In the final set of regressions, reported in tables 6 and 7, we test whether financial liberaliza-
tion and integration have any effect on real growth in output in externally dependent indus-
                                                                                                                                                                                          
11 CAPSTOCK has a positive significant sign in the OLS regression, but an insignificant sign in the IV and since 
the Hausman test indicates endogeneity, we focus on the IV-results.   13
tries. As before, the full sample results (reported in table 6) contain no significant coefficients 
for our parameter of interest, except in the case of BHL80, which is positive and significant. 
There may hence prevail some positive effects on production after liberalizing equity markets, 





When splitting the sample into two according to financial development, as reported in table 7, 
we once more obtain different results than in the full sample case. It is clear that the growth in 
real output is boosted by the financial liberalization in countries with relatively well-
developed financial markets, regardless if this is measured by accounting standards or total 
capitalization or whether OLS or IV estimators are used. BHL80 once more fails to generate 
significant positive results for the high-development group. The effect on total output – also a 




4.4. Summing up: a competition or an outsourcing effect? 
 
Altogether, considering the results reported in Tables 2-7, it seems that for countries at a rela-
tively high level of financial development, there is a clear firm-creation effect from liberaliza-
tion (Table 5) that translates into a growth effect in output (Table 7), but not into any such ef-
fects on the growth of real value added (Table 3). We have not seen any results in previous 
research pointing in this direction and thus, they are somewhat unexpected and our interpreta-
tions are preliminary and tentative.  
 
One explanation consistent with the results presented here is a competition effect. Financial 
liberalization spurs firm creation. Basic IO-theory teaches us that when new firms enter a 
market this generally means an increase in competition and aggregate production. Markups, 
and eventually profits, can decrease for incumbent firms on that market. Hence, while there   14
may be more firms on a market, the margins for each firm shrink and industry value-added 
may be unaffected or even decrease.
12 
 
Our findings could also be interpreted from the perspective of industrial vertical disintegration 
and corporate outsourcing. The basic argument would then be as follows. When financial 
markets become more liberalized, there is an increase in potential funding. This reduces the 
costs for firms and entrepreneurs of finding financiers. These reduced capital costs for start-
ups and corporate expansions, in turn, influence the choices of existing firms when it comes to 
considering outsourcing parts of their production to other units. Outsourcing has become less 
costly and, ceteris paribus, therefore more likely. Outsourcing can yield the observed pattern 
by breaking up value added chains.  
 
To make the outsourcing argument more clear, consider the following two-period example. In 
period 1, an industry consists of a single firm producing 100 units of final goods. For this 
purpose, it first produces 50 intermediate inputs, using zero inputs, and then 100 units of final 
goods, using these intermediate inputs. For the industry, the firm hence creates a value-added 
of 100. In the second period, this firm decides to outsource its intermediate production to an-
other firm. A subsidiary firm is set up to produce the 50 units of intermediate inputs that are 
delivered to the final good producer for its production of the 100 units of final goods. The fi-
nal good producer has a production of 100 units of final goods but only a value-added of 50, 
since it uses 50 units of “external” inputs. The subsidiary produces 50 units which is also its 
value-added. The growth in value-added between period 1 and 2 is therefore zero, but the 
growth in (measured) output is 50. Further, there is a growth in number of firms. Hence, this 
simple outsourcing example closely replicates our findings.  
 
Given the data at our disposal, we cannot perform a direct test that discriminates between the 
two hypotheses put forward above. If, however, price increases are relatively low in sectors 
where firm creation is high, this yields some, albeit weak, support for the competition hy-
potheses. In order to recover industry level price series, we need data on value added (or pro-
duction) in both current and constant prices. These data are not available in the UN ISY-
database, but do exist for a subset of countries in the STAN-database from the OECD (OECD, 
                                                             
12 Rajan and Zingales (2002) propose an “interest group” theory of financial development where incumbents 
oppose financial development and deregulation because it breeds competition. The theory predicts that the in-
cumbents’ opposition will be weaker when an economy allows both cross-border trade and capital flows.  
    15
1998).
13 To compute the change in producer prices between 1980 and 1990 for each ISIC in-
dustry we extract industry price series by dividing value added in current prices by value 
added in constant prices. The price changes for the 1980’s (in percent) are then regressed on 
the growth rates of firm creation and a set of industry and country dummies.  
 
As can be seen in column 1 of Table 8, there is a positive partial correlation between firm 
creation and price increases. Since firm creation and increasing prices are expected to go hand 
in hand if, for example, demand is increasing, we control for growth in value added in the 
second column. This does not affect the result. In columns 3 and 4, only countries with above 
median values of total capitalization are included. When not controlling for growth in value 
added, the positive correlation remains in this subsample, but firm creation is insignificant in 




The results in Table 8 point towards an explanation based on outsourcing rather than in-
creased competition. It is important to note, however, that this is an interpretation based on 
indirect effects at the industry-level. Actual outsourcing decisions are carried out on the firm-
level. To fully analyze the question, we would need more detailed data.  
 
Much of the previous research on explaining the observed increase in global outsourcing in 
recent decades has primarily focused on technology enhancements and improved contracting 
environments (see, e.g., Carlsson, 1999; Grossman and Helpman, 2002). Our finding on im-
proved financing opportunities through international financial liberalization hence suggests a 
partly new research agenda on the links between international financial liberalization and 




This paper investigates the growth effects of international financial liberalization. While pre-
vious work has mainly approached this problem by considering aggregate growth rates, our 
                                                             
13 The countries for which the data overlaps are Austria, Canada, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Ko-
rea, Mexico, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, UK, USA. The positive growth effects on produc-
tion holds in some and the positive growth effects on firm creation holds in most specifications for this sample of 
countries when total capitalization is above the median value (results available upon request).    16
paper analyzes the growth effects at the industry level, using the data and methodology devel-
oped by Rajan and Zingales (1998). 
 
The results are both interesting and somewhat puzzling. The main result is that industries 
highly dependent on external financing do not experience a higher growth in value added 
among countries with liberalized capital accounts or equity markets. The same result holds for 
countries more integrated with the international capital market in terms of actual capital flows 
and stocks. Although it is plausible that the growth effects of liberalization and integration 
differ between countries at different levels of financial development, we cannot draw any con-
clusions in this direction. We do, however, find significant positive effects of liberalizing 
capital accounts and equity markets on the creation of new firms and growth in production – 
given that countries have relatively well developed financial markets.
14 Hence, there may be 
growth effects of financial liberalization other than in value added. In a dynamic perspective, 
accelerated firm growth is important for a functioning creative destruction and thereby also 
for sustained long run economic development.  
 
Increased competition provides a straightforward explanation of these results. Financial liber-
alization stimulates firm creation, which increases competition and production. Value added, 
on the other hand, does not increase since the prices of final output fall. A second potential 
explanation is based of industrial vertical disintegration and corporate outsourcing. When the 
setting up of new plants is made less expensive by the liberalization of financial markets, 
firms become more inclined to outsource the parts of their production. Since outsourcing 
means breaking up value added chains, it could result in a pattern of increased firm creation, 
increased measured production and zero growth in value added. Some preliminary evidence 
point towards an explanation based on outsourcing rather than increased competition, but to 
fully analyze the question more research is needed. 
 
The increase in outsourcing in the last couple of decades has been observed by numerous 
other authors, but they have primarily explained it by technological or legal determinants and 
not, as we do, by the effects of reduced costs of corporate financing as a result of financial 
liberalization. The results on an outsourcing and/or competition effect following financial lib-
eralization and integration open up a new research agenda. To capture the entire range of the 
                                                             
14 It should be noted that the results are somewhat dependent on how financial development is measured. The 
results using accounting standards are weaker than when total capitalization is used.   17
effects of liberalized capital accounts and financial integration on domestic economic devel-
opment, combing cross-country macro data with industry- or firm-level data can be a fruitful 
approach. 
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CAPSTOCK CAPFLOW TOTCAP ACCSTAN
IMF8090  0.82  1                 
 (0.00)                  
QCAP82 0.53  0.68  1               
 (0.00)  (0.00)                 
QCAP8288  0.44 0.66 0.96  1               
 (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)                
BHL80  0.20 0.39 0.71 0.76  1             
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)               
BHL8090  0.24 0.47 0.74 0.82 0.94  1          
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)             
KSSTOCK80  0.15 0.27 0.74 0.76 0.63 0.62  1         
 (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)          
KSSTOCK8090  0.16 0.35 0.74 0.80 0.64 0.72  0.95  1        
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00)         
CAPSTOCK 0.28 0.35 0.41 0.42 0.44 0.37  0.34  0.31  1      
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)        
CAPFLOW  0.46 0.63 0.67 0.69 0.61 0.65  0.47  0.59  0.56  1     
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)      
TOTCAP  0.18 0.36 0.46 0.49 0.36 0.46  0.42  0.62  0.02  0.55  1   
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) (0.48) (0.00)    
ACCSTAN  0.13 0.39 0.42 0.50 0.56 0.58 0.40  0.47  0.21  0.47 0.41  1 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00)  
#  Obs  42 42 39 39 42 42  22  22  39  41  41 33 
Mean  0.31 0.28 0.52 0.56 0.31 0.38 0.47  0.56  0.76  0.03 0.72  61.44 
Std.  Dev.  0.46 0.41 0.23 0.24 0.46 0.44  0.46  0.40  0.50  0.03  0.37  13.44 
Note and source: IMF80 and IMF8090 are the IMF indicators of an open capital account, for 1980 and the average between 1980-1990. QCAP82 and QCAP8288 are the 
Quinn (1997) indicators of financial liberalization in the year 1982, and the average of the 1982 and 1988 values. BHL80 and BHL 8090 and KSSTOCK80 and 
KSSTOCK8090 are, respectively, the Bekeart et al. (2001) and Kaminsky and Schumkler (2001) indicators of equity market liberalization. CAPSTOCK is the average of the 
sum of the stock of inward and outward direct investment and the stock of portfolio equity and portfolio debt assets and liabilities, as share of GDP over the period 1980-90, 
taken from Lane and Milesi-Feretti (2001). CAPFLOW are the equivalent figures but on flows instead of stocks, collected from the IFS. ACCSTAN = Accounting standards, 
an index of the quality of each country’s information disclosure rules. TOTCAP = Total capitalization, the sum of domestic credits and stock market capitalization, divided by 
GDP. P-values are in parentheses.  21
 Table 2: Growth in value added, measures of financial liberalization and integration. Full sample. 
 
  Capital account liberalization measured as:   Stock market liberalization measured as:    Capital market integration measured as: 
 IMF80  QCAP82    BHL80  KSSTOCK    CAPSTOCK  CAPFLOW 
  OLS IV OLS IV    OLS IV OLS IV    OLS IV OLS IV 
Industry  share  –0.952***  –0.580***–0.584***–0.577***  –0.963***–0.606***–0.622***  –0.625**  –0.585***–0.587***–0.951***–0.959***
  (0.251) (0.149) (0.151) (0.146)  (0.250) (0.148) (0.290) (0.278)  (0.155) (0.154) (0.230) (0.254) 
0.071*** 0.051*** 0.049**  0.053*    0.066*** 0.044** 0.040**  0.038*   0.052*** 0.052*** 0.065** 0.060**  Ext. Dep. ×  
Total capitalization.  (0.024) (0.019) (0.025) (0.029)  (0.025) (0.016) (0.020) (0.020)  (0.018) (0.018) (0.029) (0.026) 
Ext. Dep. × IMF80  0.006  0.002                     
  (0.014)  (0.014)                    
Ext. Dep. × QCAP82     0.010  –0.003               
     (0.034)  (0.053)               
Ext. Dep. × BHL80         0.017  0.023*           
         (0.013)  (0.013)           
Ext. Dep. × KSSTOCK            0.007  0.011        
            (0.011)  (0.016)        
Ext. Dep. × CAPSTOCK                0.009  0.011    
                (0.008)  (0.029)    
Ext. Dep. × CAPFLOW                   0.167  0.296 
                    (0.321)  (0.456) 
F-test (p-value)    419 (0.00)   371 (0.00)     368 (0.00)   188 (0.00)     36 (0.00)   79 (0.00)
Sargan-test  (p-value)   0.27  (0.87)  0.12  (0.73)    2.20  (0.53)  6.37  (0.09)    3.69  (0.30)  4.98  (0.17)
Hausman-test (p-value)    0.01 (0.90)   0.13 (0.72)     1.13 (0.29)   0.10 (0.75)     0.01 (0.94)   0.05 (0.82)
No.  of  observations  1152 1106 1106 1106    1152 1106  666  666    1106 1106 1116 1116 
R
2  0.29 0.33 0.33 0.33    0.29 0.33 0.40  0.41  0.33  0.33  0.28  0.28 
Note: *** indicates significance at the 1-percent level, ** at the 5-percent level, * at the 10-percent level. The dependent variable is the annual compounded growth rate in real 
value added for the period 1980–90 for each ISIC industry in each country. “Industry share” is each industry’s share of total value added in manufacturing within each country 
in 1980. “Ext. Dep.” is a proxy for external financial dependence from Rajan and Zingales (1998), described in the text. The other variables are described in Table 1 and in-
struments used in the IV-estimations are reported in the text. Country- and industry fixed effects are not included in the table. F-test of excluded instruments, Sargan-test of 
overidentifying restrictions and Hausman (or Davidson-MacKinnon) test of exogeneity of the regressors. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are in parentheses.   22
Table 3: Growth in value added, financial liberalization and integration. Split sample. 
 

















–0.434** 0.064**  0.008        622  0.31  OLS 
(0.191) (0.033) (0.018)           
               
–0.450** 0.056  0.019  0.78 137 1.71  622  0.31 
High 
IV  (0.181) (0.034) (0.023)  (0.38)  (0.00)  (0.43)    
–1.417*** 0.230* 0.010       530  0.34  OLS 
(0.363) (0.119) (0.029)           
               
–0.850*** 0.110 –0.011  0.01  663  0.41  484  0.39 
IMF80 
Low 
IV  (0.250) (0.070) (0.025)  (0.94)  (0.00)  (0.93)    
–0.434** 0.068**  0.011        622  0.31  OLS 
(0.187) (0.029) (0.047)           
               
–0.451*** 0.065** 0.032 0.22  203  0.55  622  0.31 
High 
IV  (0.175) (0.030) (0.076)  (0.64)  (0.00)  (0.46)    
–0.861*** 0.119* 0.039       484  0.39  OLS 
(0.271) (0.065) (0.048)           
               
–0.846*** 0.126** –0.025 0.75 195 0.11  484  0.39 
QCAP82 
Low 
IV  (0.252) (0.061) (0.084)  (0.39)  (0.00)  (0.74)    
–0.431** 0.070***  0.003        622 0.31  OLS 
(0.192) (0.025) (0.015)           
               
–0.457** 0.072***  0.016  1.34  340  6.15  622 0.31 
High 
IV 
(0.190) (0.025) (0.011)  (0.25)  (0.00)  (0.10)    
–1.427*** 0.046*** 0.038        530  0.34  OLS 
(0.362) (0.015) (0.023)           
               




(0.252) (0.080) (0.032)  (0.87)  (0.00)  (0.41)    
–0.416** 0.051*  0.030**        368  0.49  OLS 
(0.206) (0.031) (0.012)           
               
–0.418** 0.052*  0.031** 0.02  171  3.86 368  0.49 
High 
IV 
(0.192) (0.031) (0.014)  (0.90)  (0.00)  (0.28)    
–1.067* 0.204***  –0.007        298  0.43  OLS 
(0.578) (0.071) (0.025)           
               





(0.531) (0.066) (0.033)  (0.98)  (0.00)  (0.96)    
 
…continues on next page.   23
Table 3 (continued) 
 

















–0.450** 0.080***  0.017*        622  0.32  OLS 
(0.204) (0.029) (0.009)           
               
–0.400** 0.058**  –0.017  3.85  81  2.03 622  0.30 
High 
IV  (0.189) (0.025) (0.016)  (0.05)  (0.00)  (0.57)    
–0.850*** 0.132**  –0.017        484 0.39  OLS 
(0.266) (0.066) (0.037)           
               




IV  (0.162) (0.057) (0.020)  (0.34)  (0.00)  (0.16)    
–0.420** 0.071**  –0.037        622  0.31  OLS 
(0.188) (0.022) (0.345)           
               
–0.403** 0.058**  –0.017  0.31  208  2.69 622  0.31 
High 
IV  (0.189) (0.024) (0.026)  (0.58)  (0.00)  (0.44)    
–1.446*** 0.201**  0.571        494 0.21  OLS 
(0.391) (0.101) (0.582)           
               




IV  (0.371) (0.074) (1.642)  (0.23)  (0.00)  (0.46)    
Note: *** indicates significance at the 1-percent level, ** at the 5-percent level, * at the 10-percent level. The 
dependent variable is the annual compounded growth rate in the number of establishments for the period 1980–
90 for each ISIC industry in each country.  “Fin.lib.” represents the liberalization-indicator of either the capital 
account or the stock market. “Fin.dev.” is financial development as measured by total capitalization. See Table 2 
for a description of the rest of the variables. “High” (“Low”) financial development refers to countries with 
above (below) median total capitalization. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are in parentheses, except 
for the diagnostic tests where p-values are reported. 
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Table 4: Firm creation, measures of financial liberalization and integration, Full sample. 
 
  Capital account liberalization measured as:   Stock market liberalization measured as:    Capital market integration measured as: 
 IMF80  QCAP82    BHL80  KSSTOCK    CAPSTOCK  CAPFLOW 
  OLS IV OLS IV    OLS IV OLS IV    OLS IV OLS IV 
Industry share  –0.264*  –0.374***–0.380***–0.384***   –0.257*  –0.378*** –0.192 –0.198   –0.365** –0.356*** –0.268*  –0.226 
  (0.152) (0.139) (0.189) (0.142)  (0.153) (0.139) (0.151) (0.143)  (0.144) (0.138) (0.161) (0.151) 
0.022* 0.022*  0.015  0.013   0.027** 0.020 0.042** 0.038*  0.025**  0.029**  0.014  0.052*  Ext. Dep. ×  
Total capitalization.  (0.016) (0.012) (0.014) (0.015)  (0.013) (0.013) (0.020) (0.018)  (0.012) (0.012) (0.015) (0.029) 
Ext. Dep. × IMF80  0.021**  0.013                     
  (0.010)  (0.012)                    
Ext. Dep. × QCAP82     0.034  0.042               
     (0.021)  (0.034)               
Ext. Dep. × BHL80         0.009  0.016           
         (0.009)  (0.012)           
Ext. Dep. × KSSTOCK            0.003  0.015        
            (0.010)  (0.014)        
Ext. Dep. × CAPSTOCK                0.013*  –0.032    
                (0.007)  (0.021)    
Ext. Dep. × CAPFLOW                   0.333**  –0.441 
                   (0.166)  (0.445) 
F-test (p-value)    322 (0.00)   300 (0.00)     304 (0.00)   157 (0.00)     30 (0.00)   52 (0.00)
Sargan-test  (p-value)   0.54  (0.76)  0.01  (0.91)    3.63  (0.30)  3.92  (0.27)    8.34  (0.04)  5.52  (0.14)
Hausman-test (p-value)    1.09 (0.30)   0.06 (0.81)     0.31 (0.58)   0.80 (0.37)     3.55 (0.06)   2.72 (0.10)
No.  of  observations  1034  986 986 986    1034  732 598 598    986 986 998 998 
R
2  0.46 0.47 0.47 0.47    0.45 0.47 0.47  0.47  0.47  0.46  0.46  0.45 
Note: *** indicates significance at the 1-percent level, ** at the 5-percent level, * at the 10-percent level.The dependent variable is the annual compounded growth rate in real 
output for the period 1980–90 for each ISIC industry in each country. See Table 2 for a description of the rest of the variables. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are in 
parentheses, except for the diagnostic tests where p-values are reported.   25
Table 5: Firm creation, financial liberalization and integration. Split sample. 
 

















–0.388 0.006  0.039***      530  0.33  OLS 
(0.264) (0.018) (0.013)         
               
–0.410 –0.010  0.057***  2.49  112 5.91  530  0.33 
High 
IV  (0.253) (0.020) (0.019) (0.11)  (0.00)  (0.05)     
–0.100 0.185***  0.027        504  0.54  OLS 
(0.162) (0.057) (0.020)         
               
–0.273** 0.207***  0.042  1.62  394  7.85  456 0.57 
IMF80 
Low 
IV  (0.136) (0.063) (0.027) (0.20)  (0.00)  (0.02)     
–0.404 0.025 0.065**      530  0.32  OLS 
(0.274) (0.018) (0.029)         
               
–0.506* 0.003 0.173***  4.31  115 2.64  530  0.31 
High 
IV  (0.265) (0.018) (0.055) (0.04)  (0.00)  (0.10)     
–0.268* 0.146***  0.003        456  0.57  OLS 
(0.153) (0.047) (0.034)         
               
–0.272** 0.143***  0.012  0.15  333  7.88  456 0.57 
QCAP82 
Low 
IV  (0.136) (0.045) (0.045) (0.70)  (0.00)  (0.01)     
–0.366 0.039**  0.012        530  0.32  OLS 
(0.271) (0.016) (0.011)         
               
–0.388 0.039** 0.023**  1.44 257 7.49  530  0.32 
High 
IV 
(0.252) (0.016) (0.011) (0.23)  (0.00)  (0.06)     
–0.098 0.168*** –0.008        504  0.54  OLS 
(0.161) (0.053) (0.015)         
               




(0.133) (0.073) (0.033) (0.03)  (0.00)  (0.16)     
0.188 0.057  0.036***        312  0.47  OLS 
(0.248) (0.038) (0.014)         
               
0.175 0.059  0.042***  0.60  176  1.41  312  0.47 
High 
IV 
(0.228) (0.036) (0.017) (0.44)  (0.00)  (0.70)     
–0.286 0.146*** –0.044*        286  0.49  OLS 
(0.226) (0.051) (0.026)         
               





(0.207) (0.046) (0.022) (0.92)  (0.00)  (0.09)     
 
…continues on next page.  26
Table 5 (continued) 
 

















–0.358 0.047***  0.014**        530  0.32  OLS 
(0.263) (0.016) (0.007)          
                
–0.352 0.044***  0.010  0.29 95  1.67  530  0.32 
High 
IV  (0.253) (0.014) (0.012) (0.59)  (0.00)  (0.64)     
–0.269 0.130  0.027        456  0.57  OLS 
(0.143) (0.046) (0.023)          
                




IV  (0.134) (0.044) (0.024) (0.88)  (0.00)  (0.04)     
–0.392 0.018 0.389*        530  0.32  OLS 
(0.274) (0.021) (0.212)          
                
–0.357 0.033  0.116  2.28  153  1.98  530  0.32 
High 
IV  (0.259) (0.023) (0.244) (0.13)  (0.00)  (0.58)     
–0.073 0.160***  0.036        468  0.54  OLS 
(0.168) (0.050) (0.346)          
                




IV  (0.162) (0.049) (0.644) (0.17)  (0.00)  (0.03)     
Note: *** indicates significance at the 1-percent level, ** at the 5-percent level, * at the 10-percent level. The 
dependent variable is the annual compounded growth rate in the number of establishments for the period 1980–
90 for each ISIC industry in each country.  See Tables 2 and 3 for a description of the other variables. “High” 
(“Low”) financial development refers to countries with above (below) median total capitalization. Heteroskedas-
ticity robust standard errors are in parentheses, except for the diagnostic tests where p-values are reported.  27
Table 6: Growth in output, financial liberalization and integration. Full sample. 
 
  Capital account liberalization measured as:   Stock market liberalization measured as:    Capital market integration measured as: 
 IMF80  QCAP82    BHL80  KSSTOCK    CAPSTOCK  CAPFLOW 
  OLS IV OLS IV    OLS IV OLS IV    OLS IV OLS IV 
Industry  share  –0.328***  –0.356***–0.359***–0.365***  –0.330***–0.365***–0.416***  –0.421***  –0.346***–0.343***–0.332***–0.324***
  (0.173) (0.075) (0.077) (0.076)  (0.072) (0.976) (0.124) (0.121)  (0.079) (0.073) (0.074) (0.072) 
0.045*** 0.053*** 0.049*** 0.040***   0.044*** 0.045*** 0.067*** 0.061***   0.052*** 0.054*** 0.037*** 0.057*** Ext. Dep. ×  
Total capitalization.  (0.013) (0.012) (0.014) (0.013)  (0.014) (0.012) (0.021) (0.018)  (0.013) (0.012) (0.014) (0.018) 
Ext. Dep. × IMF80  0.005  0.003                     
  (0.009)  (0.010)                    
Ext. Dep. × QCAP82     0.057  0.049               
     (0.020)  (0.031)               
Ext. Dep. × BHL80         0.005  0.022**           
         (0.009)  (0.011)           
Ext. Dep. × KSSTOCK            0.011  0.024        
            (0.010)  (0.016)        
Ext. Dep. × CAPSTOCK                0.003  –0.019    
                (0.006)  (0.015)    
Ext. Dep. × CAPFLOW                   0.222*  –0.212 
                   (0.135)  (0.290) 
F-test (p-value)    444 (0.00)   420 (0.00)     361 (0.00)   159 (0.00)     82 (0.00)   92 (0.00)
Sargan-test  (p-value)   4.79  (0.09)  1.98  (0.16)    5.12  (0.16)  12.5  (0.01)    2.01  (0.57)  2.78  (0.42)
Hausman-test (p-value)    0.31 (0.57)   1.38 (0.24)     3.23 (0.07)   3.23 (0.07)     2.91 (0.08)   2.83 (0.09)
No.  of  observations  1223 1154 1154 1154    1223 1154  674  674    1165 1165 1187 1187 
R
2  0.44 0.50 0.50 0.50    0.44 0.50 0.60  0.60  0.50  0.50  0.44  0.44 
Note: *** indicates significance at the 1-percent level, ** at the 5-percent level, * at the 10-percent level. The dependent variable is the annual compounded growth rate in real 
output for the period 1980–90 for each ISIC industry in each country. See Table 2 for a description of the other variables. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are in pa-
rentheses, except for the diagnostic tests where p-values are reported.   28
Table 7: Growth in output, financial liberalization and integration. Split sample. 
 

















–0.511*** 0.046**  0.034***        635  0.43  OLS 
(0.131) (0.019) (0.013)          
              
–0.514*** 0.039**  0.044*** 0.93  140  3.62 635  0.43 
High 
IV  (0.215) (0.018) (0.017)  (0.34)  (0.00)  (0.16)     
–0.264*** 0.121**  –0.015        588  0.47  OLS 
(0.080) (0.060) (0.017)           
               
–0.283 0.177*** –0.003 0.00 583 2.34  519  0.57 
IMF80 
Low 
IV  (0.084) (0.055) (0.016)  (0.99)  (0.00)  (0.31)     
–0.520*** 0.065***  0.045*        635 0.43  OLS 
(0.131) (0.019) (0.025)           
               
–0.554** 0.055*** 0.120*** 2.52  186  0.50 635  0.42 
High 
IV  (0.131) (0.018) (0.044)  (0.11)  (0.00)  (0.48)     
–0.286*** 0.184***  0.036        519 0.57  OLS 
(0.089) (0.050) (0.038)           
               
–0.288*** 0.186***  0.060  0.37  233  0.93  519 0.57 
QCAP82 
Low 
IV  (0.084) (0.048) (0.051)  (0.54)  (0.00)  (0.33)     
–0.520*** 0.071***  0.002        635 0.42  OLS 
(0.131) (0.019) (0.011)           
               
–0.520*** 0.074***  0.016  2.61  349  6.57  635 0.42 
High 
IV 
(0.127) (0.019) (0.010)  (0.11)  (0.00)  (0.09)     
–0.267*** 0.111*  0.026        588  0.47  OLS 
(0.080) (0.058) (0.019)           
               




(0.083) (0.052) (0.024)  (0.25)  (0.00)  (0.73)     
–0.519** 0.111*** 0.036***        366  0.50  OLS 
(0.214) (0.043) (0.013)           
               
–0.524*** 0.112***  0.041***  0.25  167  2.68  366 0.50 
High 
IV 
(0.202) (0.042) (0.015)  (0.62)  (0.00)  (0.44)     
–0.434** 0.215***  0.009        308  0.70  OLS 
(0.172) (0.058) (0.018)           
               





(0.159) (0.053) (0.025)  (0.59)  (0.00)  (0.80)     
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Table 7 (continued) 
 

















–0.505*** 0.077***  0.010        635 0.42  OLS 
(0.131) (0.020) (0.007)           
               
–0.505*** 0.077***  0.009 95  2.84  0.01  635  0.43 
High 
IV  (0.125) (0.019) (0.014)  (0.00)  (0.42)  (0.92)    
–0.273*** 0.199***  –0.027        530 0.57  OLS 
(0.085) (0.055) (0.022)           
               




IV  (0.080) (0.053) (0.030)  (0.00)  (0.60)  (0.91)     
–0.511*** 0.060***  0.257*        635 0.43  OLS 
(0.132) (0.020) (0.146)           
               
–0.506*** 0.066***  0.121 209  3.01  0.63  635  0.43 
High 
IV  (0.126) (0.021) (0.216)  (0.00)  (0.39)  (0.43)     
–0.263*** 0.129**  0.149        552  0.47  OLS 
(0.085) (0.058) (0.425)           
               




IV  (0.081) (0.068) (1.181)  (0.00)  (0.58)  (0.21)     
Note: *** indicates significance at the 1-percent level, ** at the 5-percent level, * at the 10-percent level. The 
dependent variable is the annual compounded growth rate in the number of establishments for the period 1980–
90 for each ISIC industry in each country.  See Tables 2 and 3 for a description of the other variables. “High” 
(“Low”) financial development refers to countries with above (below) median total capitalization. Heteroskedas-
ticity robust standard errors are in parentheses, except for the diagnostic tests where p-values are reported. 
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Table 8. Explaining changes in price levels 
  Dependent variable is the percentage change in 
industry price levels between 1980 and 1990. 














      
No.  of  observations  324 323 230 229 
R
2  0.91 0.91 0.80 0.81 
Note: *** indicates significance at the 1-percent level, ** at the 5-percent level, * at the  
10-percent level. The dependent variable is the percentage change in price levels between 
 1980 and 1990 for each ISIC industry in each country. Country- and industry fixed  
effects are included but not shown. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are in  
parentheses. 
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Table A1. Indicators of liberalization 
Country IMF80  QCAP82  BHL80  KSSTOCK80  CAPSTOCK  CAPFLOW 
Australia 0 .5  1  . .742694  .0562806 
Austria 0  .75  1  .  1.172527  .0383822 
Bangladesh 0  .  0  .  . .0000203 
Brazil 0  .375  0 .5  .4665384  .0083611 
Canada 1  .75  1  1  1.1765  .0572943 
Chile 0  .5  0 0  1.031781  .0228369 
Columbia 0 .375 0  0  .5325444  .0147017 
Costa Rica  1  .375  0  .  1.21825  .0235035 
Egypt 0  .375  0  .  1.274474  .0262076 
Finland 0 .5 1  .5  .6951951  .0392009 
France 0  .625  1  1  .8920823  .0359365 
Germany 1  1  1  1  .7598786  .0354987 
Greece 0  .5  0  .  .0488642  .0115876 
India 0  .25  0 .  .1782569  . 
Indonesia 1  .625 0  0  .4505696  .005563 
Israel 0  .5  0 .  .0612123  .0266216 
Italy 0  .75  1 1  .5622534  .0168005 
Jamaica 0 .  0  .  1.255333  .0095036 
Japan 1  .625  0 0  .4995376  .0504401 
Jordan 0  .375  0  .  1.004601  .0109161 
Kenya 0 . 0  .  .  .0062992 
Korea 0  .5  0 0  .4965836  .0109355 
Malaysia 1 .5  0  .5  .5231221  .0537342 
Mexico 1  .375  0  0  .5225904  .0200498 
Morocco 0  .125  0  .  .9217592  .0039101 
Netherlands 1  .75  1  .  1.947572  .0912627 
New Zeeland  0  .625  0  .  1.236027  .0484484 
Nigeria 0  .25  0  .  .  .0184015 
Norway 0 .5 1  0  .8998007  .0466735 
Pakistan 0  .25 0  .  .470136  .0053546 
Peru 1  .375  0 0  .6959333  .0020136 
Philippines 0  .25  0  0 .7374972  .0080224 
Portugal 0  .375  0  0  .1630504  .0261469 
Sri Lanka  0  .125  0  .  .6738331  .0074351 
Singapore 1  1  1  . .8321908  .1469173 
South Africa  0  .375  0  .  .0678706  .011975 
Spain 0  .5  0 1  .4833221  .024915 
Sweden 0  .75  1  1  .916338  .0437282 
Turkey 0  .25  0  .  .3829049  .0056955 
UK 1  1  1  1  2.664083  .1067 
USA 1  1  1 1  .5350813  .0265935 
Venezuela 1 .75  0  1  .6150251  .0474498 
IMF80 is the IMF indicator of an open capital account for 1980. QCAP82 is the Quinn (1997) indicator of capi-
tal account liberalization in the year 1982. BHL80 and KSSTOCK80 are the Bekeart et al. (2001) and Kaminsky 
and Schumkler (2001) indicators of equity market liberalization. CAPSTOCK is the average of the sum of the 
stock of inward and outward direct investment, and the stock of portfolio equity and portfolio debt assets and 
liabilities, as a share of GDP over the period 1980-90, taken from Lane and Milesi-Feretti (2001). CAPFLOW 
constitute the equivalent figures, but on flows instead of stocks, collected from the IFS. 
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Table A2: Growth in value added, measures of financial liberalization and integration, Full sample. 
 
  Capital account liberalization measured as:   Stock market liberalization measured as:    Capital market integration measured as: 
 IMF80  QCAP82    BHL80  KSSTOCK80    CAPSTOCK  CAPFLOW 
  OLS IV OLS IV    OLS IV OLS IV    OLS IV OLS IV 
Industry  share  –0.691***  –0.688***–0.701***–0.708***  –0.678** –0.687*** –0.638**  –0.643**  –0.439** –0.438***–0.660***–0.672***
  (0.217) (0.211) (0.220) (0.215)  (0.215) (0.210) (0.282) (0.272)  (0.139) (0.134) (0.224) (0.216) 
0.150*** 0.151*** 0.126*** 0.119***   0.142*** 0.117**  0.168*** 0.160***   0.147*** 0.149*** 0.136*** 0.123*** Ext. Dep. ×  
Accounting standards  (0.034) (0.032) (0.037) (0.037)  (0.043) (0.049) (0.044) (0.039)  (0.035) (0.040) (0.038) (0.043) 
Ext. Dep. × IMF80  0.015  0.013                     
  (0.011)  (0.015)                    
Ext. Dep. × QCAP82     0.049*  0.061               
     (0.029)  (0.040)               
Ext. Dep. × BHL80         0.007  0.019           
         (0.012)  (0.019)           
Ext. Dep. × KSSTOCK            –0.004  0.002        
            (0.012)  (0.016)        
Ext. Dep. × CAPSTOCK                –0.004  –0.006    
                (0.006)  (0.026)    
Ext. Dep. × CAPFLOW                   0.185  0.315 
                   (0.198)  (0.297) 
Hausman-test (p-value)    0.10 (0.75)   0.15 (0.70)     0.63 (0.43)   0.19 (0.66)     0.01 (0.94)   0.35 (0.56)
F-test (p-value)    332 (0.00)   400 (0.00)     224 (0.00)   187 (0.00)     28 (0.00)   170 (0.00)
Sargan-test  (p-value)   2.26  (0.32)  0.39  (0.53)    4.21  (0.24)  0.07  (1.00)    7.16  (0.07)  6.82  (0.08)
No.  of  observations  1020 1020 1020 1020    1020 1020  666  666    995  995  984  984 
R
2  0.35 0.43 0.35 0.43    0.35 0.43 0.41  0.48  0.42  0.52  0.34  0.42 
Note: *** indicates significance at the 1-percent level, ** at the 5-percent level, * at the 10-percent level. The dependent variable is the annual compounded growth rate in real 
output for the period 1980–90 for each ISIC industry in each country. See Table 2 for a description of the rest of the variables. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are in 
parentheses, except for the diagnostic tests where p-values are reported.   33
Table A3: Growth in value added, financial liberalization and integration. Split sample. 
 

















–0.523** 0.244**  0.021        413  0.45  OLS 
(0.245) (0.106) (0.013)           
               
–0.368*** 0.164* 0.036*  0.21 92 7.30  419  0.51 
High 
IV  (0.142) (0.098) (0.021)  (0.65)  (0.00)  (0.03)    
–0.887*** 0.161*** 0.011        607  0.35  OLS 
(0.303) (0.062) (0.018)           
               
–0.796*** 0.175*** –0.007 0.12 486  4.82  595  0.47 
IMF80 
Low 
IV  (0.202) (0.061) (0.015)  (0.73)  (0.00)  (0.09)    
–0.487** 0.219*  0.011        413  0.44  OLS 
(0.247) (0.113) (0.034)           
               
–0.410*** –0.159 0.164*  1.79 41 5.46  419  0.48 
High 
IV  (0.154) (0.163) (0.095)  (0.18)  (0.00)  (0.02)    
–0.907*** 0.130* 0.068       607  0.35  OLS 
(0.307) (0.067) (0.042)           
               
–0.796*** 0.177*** –0.031 0.04 371  1.29  595  0.47 
QCAP82 
Low 
IV  (0.205) (0.063) (0.043)  (0.83)  (0.00)  (0.26)    
–0.471* 0.332**  –0.016        413  0.44  OLS 
(0.249) (0.165) (0.022)           
               
–0.341** 0.391*  –0.043  0.24  98  7.95 419  0.50 
High 
IV 
(0.141) (0.215) (0.030)  (0.62)  (0.00)  (0.05)    
–0.903*** 0.139** 0.023       607  0.35  OLS 
(0.306) (0.066) (0.017)           
               




(0.205) (0.061) (0.024)  (0.16)  (0.00)  (0.41)    
–0.847** 0.278**  –0.013        307  0.52  OLS 
(0.336) (0.124) (0.014)           
               
–0.414*** –0.007 0.022  2.17  92  1.86  303  0.57 
High 
IV 
(0.152) (0.121) (0.023)  (0.14)  (0.00)  (0.60)    
–0.732* 0.196**  –0.002        359  0.43  OLS 
(0.432) (0.090) (0.018)           
               





(0.166) (0.070) (0.017)  (0.85)  (0.00)  (0.45)    
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Table A3 (continued) 
 

















–0.475* 0.266**  –0.006        413  0.44  OLS 
(0.284) (0.115) (0.008)           
               
–0.341** 0.140  –0.001 2.31 245 8.98  419  0.50 
High 
IV  (0.142) (0.102) (0.008)  (0.13)  (0.00)  (0.03)    
–0.528*** 0.195***  0.006        582 0.43  OLS 
(0.189) (0.059) (0.014)           
               




IV  (0.132) (0.060) (0.020)  (0.41)  (0.00)  (0.70)    
–0.510** 0.196*  0.166        413  0.44  OLS 
(0.252) (0.108) (0.212)           
               
–0.365*** 0.060  0.319*  2.68 594  7.56  419  0.50 
High 
IV  (0.139) (0.100) (0.187)  (0.10)  (0.00)  (0.06)    
–0.837*** 0.159**  0.286        571 0.34  OLS 
(0.384) (0.162) (0.485)           
               




IV  (0.211) (0.061) (0.565)  (0.25)  (0.00)  (0.27)    
Note: *** indicates significance at the 1-percent level, ** at the 5-percent level, * at the 10-percent level. The 
dependent variable is the annual compounded growth rate in value added for the period 1980–90 for each ISIC 
industry in each country.  See Tables 2 and 3 for a description of the other variables. “High” (“Low”) financial 
development refers to countries with above (below) median accounting standards. Heteroskedasticity robust 
standard errors are in parentheses except, for the diagnostic tests where p-values are reported.  35
Table A4: Firm creation, measures of financial liberalization and integration, Full sample. 
 
  Capital account liberalization measured as:   Stock market liberalization measured as:    Capital market integration measured as: 
 IMF80  QCAP82    BHL80  KSSTOCK    CAPSTOCK  CAPFLOW 
  OLS IV OLS IV    OLS IV OLS IV    OLS IV OLS IV 
Industry share  –0.378**  –0.376** –0.377** –0.388**   –0.350** –0.354** –0.198 –0.204   –0.163* –0.165*  –0.384** –0.370**
  (0.165) (0.162) (0.170) (0.165)  (0.165) (0.160) (0.148) (0.141)  (0.095) (0.092) (0.180) (0.170) 
0.077*** 0.078*** 0.052*  0.039    0.083**  0.059  0.127*** 0.103***   0.071*** 0.088*** 0.054*  0.070**  Ext. Dep. ×  
Accounting standards  (0.025) (0.024) (0.029) (0.030)  (0.035) (0.040) (0.035) (0.028)  (0.026) (0.033) (0.028) (0.035) 
Ext. Dep. × IMF80  0.026***  0.024*                    
  (0.010)  (0.014)                    
Ext. Dep. × QCAP82     0.057**  0.078**               
     (0.028)  (0.039)               
Ext. Dep. × BHL80         0.002  0.015           
         (0.012)  (0.018)           
Ext. Dep. × KSSTOCK            –0.006  0.013        
            (0.010)  (0.014)        
Ext. Dep. × CAPSTOCK                0.010  –0.010    
                (0.007)  (0.020)    
Ext. Dep. × CAPFLOW                   0.322*  0.169 
                   (0.178)  (0.206) 
Hausman-test (p-value)    0.04 (0.85)   0.39 (0.53)     0.56 (0.45)   1.48 (0.22)     0.76 (0.38)   0.40 (0.53)
F-test (p-value)    317 (0.00)   317 (0.00)     196 (0.00)   146 (0.00)     26 (0.00)   154 (0.00)
Sargan-test  (p-value)   1.48  (0.47)  0.01  (0.93)    4.29  (0.23)  1.60  (0.66)    8.57  (0.04)  6.02  (0.11)
No.  of  observations  936 936 936 936    936 936 598 598    905 905 900 900 
R
2  0.32 0.32 0.32 0.32    0.31 0.31 0.48  0.48  0.42  0.42  0.32  0.32 
Note: *** indicates significance at the 1-percent level, ** at the 5-percent level, * at the 10-percent level. The dependent variable is the annual compounded growth rate in real 
output for the period 1980–90 for each ISIC industry in each country. See Table 2 for a description of the rest of the variables. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are in 
parentheses, except for the diagnostic tests where p-values are reported.   36
Table A5: Firm creation, financial liberalization and integration. Split sample. 
 

















–0.093 0.138 0.023*       376  0.48  OLS 
(0.208) (0.098) (0.013)         
               
–0.108 –0.141 0.028*  0.29  214 0.91  376  0.48 
High 
IV  (0.195) (0.094) (0.017) (0.59)  (0.00)  (0.64)     
–0.646** 0.060  0.024        560  0.26  OLS 
(0.218) (0.050) (0.017)         
               
–0.646** 0.057  0.020  0.32 562 1.55  560  0.26 
IMF80 
Low 
IV  (0.247) (0.048) (0.021) (0.57)  (0.00)  (0.46)     
–0.052 0.079  0.024       376  0.47  OLS 
(0.221) (0.111) (0.037)         
               
–0.192 –0.136  0.137 1.22 26 1.21  376  0.48 
High 
IV  (0.220) (0.182) (0.095) (0.27)  (0.00)  (0.27)     
–0.655** 0.028  0.071*        560  0.26  OLS 
(0.284) (0.050) (0.038)         
               
–0.652** 0.032  0.055  0.28 348 0.02  560  0.26 
QCAP82 
Low 
IV  (0.270) (0.046) (0.042) (0.59)  (0.00)  (0.88)     
–0.013 0.374* –0.038        376  0.48  OLS 
(0.208) (0.201) (0.026)         
               
–0.010 0.458** –0.051*  1.39 147 3.43  376  0.48 
High 
IV 
(0.192) (0.097) (0.027) (0.30)  (0.00)  (0.33)     
–0.652** 0.035  0.022        560  0.26  OLS 
(0.283) (0.048) (0.016)         
               




(0.271) (0.044) (0.030) (0.77)  (0.00)  (0.82)     
0.152 0.175 –0.007       279  0.49  OLS 
(0.294) (0.152) (0.018)         
               
0.171 –0.134 0.047  2.35  45 2.80  279  0.48 
High 
IV 
(0.273) (0.193) (0.034) (0.13)  (0.00)  (0.42)     
–0.070 0.128* –0.009        396  0.47  OLS 
(0.220) (0.072) (0.016)         
               





(0.207) (0.062) (0.014) (0.32)  (0.00)  (0.97)     
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Table A5 (continued) 
 

















–0.020 0.102  0.007        376  0.47  OLS 
(0.214) (0.100) (0.010)          
                
–0.017 0.082  0.013  1.24  436  4.31  376  0.47 
High 
IV  (0.201) (0.089) (0.010) (0.27)  (0.00)  (0.23)     
–0.268* 0.079*  0.015        529  0.38  OLS 
(0.137) (0.045) (0.013)          
                




IV  (0.135) (0.108) (0.067) (0.20)  (0.00)  (0.15)     
–0.015 0.100  0.104        376  0.47  OLS 
(0.224) (0.096) (0.167)          
                
–0.078 0.070  0.233  3.46  1143  3.72  376  0.47 
High 
IV  (0.208) (0.094) (0.177) (0.06)  (0.00)  (0.29)     
–0.660** 0.050  0.645        524  0.26  OLS 
(0.313) (0.046) (0.430)          
                




IV  (0.302) (0.051)  (1.65)  (0.05) (0.00) (0.24)     
Note: *** indicates significance at the 1-percent level, ** at the 5-percent level, * at the 10-percent level. The 
dependent variable is the annual compounded growth rate for the number of establishments for the period 1980–
90 for each ISIC industry in each country.  See Tables 2 and 3 for a description of the other variables. “High” 
(“Low”) financial development refers to countries with above (below) median accounting standards. Heteroske-
dasticity robust standard errors are in parentheses, except for the diagnostic tests where p-values are reported.   38
Table A6: Growth in output, measures of financial liberalization and integration, Full sample. 
 
  Capital account liberalization measured as:   Stock market liberalization measured as:    Capital market integration measured as: 
 IMF80  QCAP82    BHL80  KSSTOCK    CAPSTOCK  CAPFLOW 
  OLS IV OLS IV    OLS IV OLS IV    OLS IV OLS IV 
Industry  share  –0.329***  –0.577***–0.359***–0.587***  –0.330***–0.577***–0.416***  –0.333***  –0.400***–0.400***–0.589***–0.601***
  (0.073) (0.141) (0.078) (0.142)  (0.072) (0.141) (0.124) (0.118)  (0.100) (0.097) (0.150) (0.144) 
0.045*** 0.162*** 0.049*** 0.139***   0.044*** 0.165  0.067*** 0.188***   0.160*** 0.153*** 0.150*** 0.111**  Ext. Dep. ×  
Total capitalization.  (0.013) (0.036) (0.014) (0.038)  (0.014) (0.053) (0.021) (0.040)  (0.042) (0.043) (0.043) (0.045) 
Ext. Dep. × IMF80  0.005  –0.001                    
  (0.009)  (0.012)                    
Ext. Dep. × QCAP82     0.016  0.038               
     (0.020)  (0.037)               
Ext. Dep. × BHL80         0.005  –0.002           
         (0.009)  (0.017)           
Ext. Dep. × KSSTOCK            0.011  0.016        
            (0.010)  (0.017)        
Ext. Dep. × CAPSTOCK                –0.007  0.001    
                (0.007)  (0.018)    
Ext. Dep. × CAPFLOW                   0.120  0.525** 
                   (0.172)  (0.252) 
Hausman-test (p-value)    3.02 (0.08)   1.24 (0.27)     2.22 (0.14)   1.76 (0.18)     0.30 (0.58)   6.53 (0.01)
F-test (p-value)    321 (0.00)   345 (0.00)     211 (0.00)   174 (0.00)     70 (0.00)   256 (0.00)
Sargan-test  (p-value)   3.68  (0.16)  2.76  (0.10)    4.05  (0.41)  1.37  (0.71)    8.81  (0.03)  9.73  (0.02)
No.  of  observations  1223 1014 1154 1014    1223 1014  674  642    988  988  978  978 
R
2  0.44 0.44 0.50 0.44    0.44 0.44 0.60  0.58  0.52  0.52  0.43  0.43 
Note: *** indicates significance at the 1-percent level, ** at the 5-percent level, * at the 10-percent level. The dependent variable is the annual compounded growth rate in real 
output for the period 1980–90 for each ISIC industry in each country. See Table 2 for a description of the rest of the variables. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are in 
parentheses, except for the diagnostic tests where p-values are reported.   39
Table A7: Growth in output, financial liberalization and integration. Split sample. 
 
 

















–0.364** 0.161  0.031**        419  0.51  OLS 
(0.150) (0.100) (0.015)          
              
–0.368*** 0.165*  0.036*  0.21  92  7.30 419  0.51 
High 
IV  (0.121) (0.098) (0.021)  (0.65)  (0.00)  (0.03)     
–0.796*** 0.175***  –0.004        595 0.47  OLS 
(0.252) (0.064) (0.014)           
               
–0.796*** 0.175***  –0.007  0.12  486  4.82  595 0.47 
IMF80 
Low 
IV  (0.202) (0.061) (0.015)  (0.73)  (0.00)  (0.09)     
–0.350** 0.099  0.021        419  0.50  OLS 
(0.149) (0.199) (0.033)           
               
–0.410*** –0.159  0.164*  1.79  41  5.46 419  0.48 
High 
IV  (0.155) (0.163) (0.095)  (0.18)  (0.00)  (0.02)     
–0.794*** 0.180***  –0.009        595 0.47  OLS 
(0.214) (0.066) (0.039)           
               
–0.796*** 0.177***  –0.003  0.04  595  1.29  595 0.47 
QCAP82 
Low 
IV  (0.205) (0.063) (0.043)  (0.84)  (0.00)  (0.26)     
–0.341** 0.348  –0.036        419  0.50  OLS 
(0.150) (0.217) (0.028)           
               
–0.341** 0.392*  –0.043 0.24  98  7.95  419  0.50 
High 
IV 
(0.1141) (0.019)  (0.030)  (0.62) (0.00) (0.05)     
–0.788*** 0.188***  –0.013        595 0.47  OLS 
(0.215) (0.067) (0.019)           
               




(0.205) (0.065) (0.024)  (0.16)  (0.00)  (0.41)     
–0.400** 0.183  –0.016        303  0.57  OLS 
(0.160) (0.141) (0.017)           
               
–0.414*** –0.007  0.022  2.17  92  1.86 303  0.57 
High 
IV 
(0.152) (0.121) (0.023)  (0.14)  (0.00)  (0.60)     
–0.389** 0.242***  0.008        339  0.65  OLS 
(0.178) (0.077) (0.015)           
               





(0.166) (0.070) (0.017)  (0.85)  (0.00)  (0.45)     
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Table A7 (continued) 
 

















–0.340** 0.168  –0.008        419  0.50  OLS 
(0.151) (0.113) (0.009)           
               
–0.341** 0.140  –0.001 2.32  245 8.98  419  0.50 
High 
IV  (0.142) (0.102) (0.008)  (0.13)  (0.00)  (0.03)    
–0.539*** 0.153**  –0.007        569  0.58  OLS 
(0.139) (0.064) (0.014)           
               




IV  (0.133) (0.060) (0.020)  (0.41)  (0.00)  (0.70)     
–0.356** 0.090  0.197        419  0.50  OLS 
(0.150) (0.103) (0.167)           
               
–0.365*** 0.060  0.319* 2.68  594 1.86  303  0.57 
High 
IV  (0.139) (0.100) (0.187)  (0.10)  (0.00)  (0.60)     
–0.804*** 0.174**  –0.110        559  0.46  OLS 
(0.222) (0.064) (0.395)           
               




IV  (0.211) (0.061) (0.565)  (0.25)  (0.00)  (0.27)     
Note: *** indicates significance at the 1-percent level, ** at the 5-percent level, * at the 10-percent level. The de-
pendent variable is the annual compounded growth rate in real output for the period 1980–90 for each ISIC indus-
try in each country.  See Tables 2 and 3 for a description of the other variables. “High” (“Low”) financial devel-
opment refers to countries with above (below) median accounting standards. Heteroskedasticity robust standard 
errors are in parentheses, except for the diagnostic tests where p-values are reported. 
 
 